State of Utah v. Steven Michael Stilling : Reply Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1987
State of Utah v. Steven Michael Stilling : Reply Brief
of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
David L Wilkinson; Attorney General; Attorney for Respondent.
James C. Bradshaw; Joan C. Watt; Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme Court
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Stilling, No. 870094.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1987).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1610
JTAH 
DO 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH 
m lur 
THE STATE OF UTAH, , 
V* 
/Respondent, 
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING, 
Defendant/Appellant• 
Case No. 870094 
Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Judgment and Conviction of Aggravated 
Robbery, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
Section 76-6-302, 76-2-2-2, and 76-3-203 (1), (4) (1953) and being 
an Habitual Criminal in violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 
76-8-1002 (1953) in the Third Judicial Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable David B. Dee presiding. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
JOAN C. WATT 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
IT33 SB H 2 5 ^ r * 1 J*' 
C'srk, Si ra 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Judgment and Conviction of Aggravated 
Robbery, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
Section 76-6-302, 76-2-2-2, and 76-3-203 (1), (4) (1953) and being 
an Habitual Criminal in violation of Utah Code Ann. Section 
76-8-1002 (1953) in the Third Judicial Court, in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable David B. Dee presiding. 
JAMES C. BRADSHAW 
JOAN C. WATT 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
333 South Second East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorney for Respondent 
Case No. 870094 
Priority No. 2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PAGE 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
INTRODUCTION 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
DISMISS THE CHARGES WHERE THE STATE 
FAILED TO BRING MR. STILLING TO TRIAL 
WITHIN THE REQUISITE 120 DAYS. . . . 
CONCLUSION 
ii. 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
PAGE 
Coit v. State, 440 So.2d 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) . . . 10 
Commonwealth v. Gonce, 320 Pa. Super. Ct. 19, 
466 A.2d 1039 (1983) . 10 
Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 101 S.Ct. 703, 
66 L.Ed.2d 642 (1981) 3, 4 
Dorsey v. State, 490 N.E.2d 260 (Ind. 1986) 3 
People v. Lincoln, 42 Colo. App. 512, 601 P.2d 641 (1979) . . 10 
People v. Office, 126 Mich. App. 597, 337 N.W. 592 (1982) . . 10 
State v. Barefield, 735 P.2d 1339 (Wash. App. 1987) 10 
State v. Clark, 222 Kan. 65, 563 P.2d 1028 (1977) . . . . . . 10 
State v. Stillings, 709 P.2d 348 (Utah 1985) . 11 
Stroble v. Anderson, 587 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1978) 3 
United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 
56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978) 3, 5, 8, 12, 13 
United States v. Roy, 830 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1987) 12 
Williams v. State, 426 So.2d 1121 (Fla. App. 1983), 
petition for review denied, 437 So.2d 677 (Fla. 1983). . . 9 
STATUTE CITED 
Utah Code Ann. S77-29-5 (1953 as amended) 2, 7, 8, 11 
iii. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
v. : 
STEVEN MICHAEL STILLING, : Case No. 870094 
Defendant/Appellant. : Priority No. 2 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
The Statement of the Case and Statement of Facts are set 
forth in Appellant's Opening Brief at 1-5. Mr. Stilling takes this 
opportunity to reply to Point I of Respondent's Brief, issues to 
which Mr. Stilling does not reply are adequately covered in 
Appellant's Opening Brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Filing warrants with Weber County after filing a detainer 
with Oregon Officials was a request for temporary custody, thereby 
triggering the requirement that Mr. Stilling be tried on those 
charges within 120 days. Because Salt Lake County failed to bring 
Mr. Stilling to trial within 120 days, the matter should have been 
dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO DISMISS 
THE CHARGES WHERE THE STATE FAILED TO 
BRING MR, STILLING TO TRIAL WITHIN THE 
REQUISITE 120 DAYS, 
(Reply to Point I in Respondent's Brief) 
In responding to Mr. Stilling's opening brief, the State 
strained the facts and mischaracterized the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers ("I.A.D." or "Agreement") and supporting case law. The 
State incorrectly analyzed several major points in addressing this 
issue. 
Firstf the State incorrectly introduces the I.A.D. by 
stating that its purpose "is to provide a mechanism for prisoners 
serving a term of imprisonment to insist upon speedy and final 
disposition of untried charges that are the subjects of detainers so 
that prison rehabilitation programs initiated for a prisoner's 
benefit will not be disrupted or precluded by the existence of the 
untried charges.'1 Brief of Respondent at 12. In characterizing the 
purpose of the I.A.D. as solely to further rehabilitation effortsf 
the State ignores the overall purpose of the I.A.D. which is to 
provide a fair and speedy means for disposition. 
Article I of the I.A.D. outlines its purpose. It states: 
The party states find that charges outstanding 
against a prisoner, detainers based on untried 
indictments9 informations or complaints9 and 
difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons 
already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce 
uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner 
treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is 
the policy of the party states and the purpose of 
this agreement to encourage the expeditious and 
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orderly disposition of such charges and 
determination of the proper status of any and all 
detainers based on untried indictments, information 
or complaints. The party states also find that 
proceedings with reference to such charges and 
detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, 
cannot properly be had in the absence of 
co-operative procedures. It is the further purpose 
of this agreement to provide such co-operative 
procedures. 
In United States v. Mauroy 436 U.S. 340, 98 S.Ct. 1834, 
56 L.Ed.2d 329 (1978), the United States Supreme Court outlined the 
purpose of the I.A.D. and the history behind its adoption. The 
Mauro Court pointed out that the I.A.D. sets out its purpose in 
Article I then stated: "Accordingly, its purpose is to encourage 
the expeditious disposition of such charges and to provide 
cooperative procedures among member states to facilitate such 
disposition." Mauro, 436 U.S. at 351. In Stroble v. Anderson, 587 
F.2d 830, 837 (6th Cir. 1978), the Court echoed this statement. See 
also Dorsey v. State, 490 N.E.2d 260, 264 (Ind. 1986). Hence the 
focus is on speedy disposition of charges and not the interference 
with rehabilitation that the State emphasizes. 
In addition, in Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 101 S.Ct. 
703, 66 L.Ed.2d 642 (1981), the United States Supreme Court pointed 
out that the legislative history of the Agreement indicated "that a 
primary purpose of the Agreement is to protect prisoners against 
whom detainers are outstanding." 449 U.S. at 448. The Court quoted 
the House and Senate Reports which stated: 
n[A] prisoner who has had a detainer lodged 
against him is seriously disadvantaged by such 
action. He is in custody and therefore in no 
position to seek witnesses or to preserve his 
defense. He must often be kept in close custody and 
is ineligible for desirable work assignments. What 
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is more, when detainers are filed against a prisoner 
he sometimes loses interest in institutional 
opportunities because he must serve his sentence 
without knowing what additional sentences may lie 
before him, or when, if ever, he will be in a 
position to employ the education and skills he may 
be developing." HR Rep. No. 91-1018, p.3 (1970)? S. 
Rep. No. 91-1356, p. 3 (1970). 
Id,, at 449. 
Therefore the State's emphasis on the initiation and 
continuation of prison rehabilitation programs in outlining the 
purpose of the Agreement is incorrect. The purpose of the 
Agreement, as repeatedly stated by various courts, is to allow for 
the speedy and orderly disposition of detainers so that "a prisoner 
who has had a detainer lodged against him is [not] seriously 
disadvantaged by such action." Id. While the disadvantage to a 
prisoner of having a detainer lodged against him may include 
interference with rehabilitation programs, it also includes 
difficulty in preparing a defense, stricter conditions of custody, 
lack of eligibility for desirable work assignments and the 
psychological effect of uncertainties associated with unresolved 
cases. 
The State suggests Mr. Stilling was not in a position to 
participate in prison rehabilitation programming at the Oregon State 
Prison. Respondent's Brief at 12. Such a statement is not 
supported by the record. Furthermore, the I.A.D. does not require a 
defendant to establish that he was unable to participate in 
rehabilitation programs while a detainer was lodged in order to make 
the I.A.D. applicable. By its terms, the Agreement was invoked when 
Salt Lake County filed its detainer with the Oregon State Prison. 
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The State's introductory paragraph also suggests that the 
I.A.D. is a mechanism for "prisoners . . . to insist" on speedy 
disposition. Respondent's Brief at 12. The focus also incorrectly 
characterizes the Agreement since the I.A.D. provides a mechanism 
not only for prisoners to request speedy disposition as set forth 
in Article III, but also a mechanism, along with responsibilities, 
by which a receiving state can obtain custody of a prisoner in 
another state and dispose of pending charges. 
The I.A.D. was created and entered into by the states as 
a means by which the states could deal effectively with prisoners 
who had pending charges in various jurisdictions in a workable, 
cooperative and organized manner. See Mauro, 436 U.S. at 351. 
Articles III and IV demonstrate that both the state and the prisoner 
have options, rights and obligations under the Act. The State's 
attempt in its brief to label the purpose of the I.A.D. as being a 
narrow prisoner option only purpose is self serving and erroneous. 
The State also attempts to obfuscate the issue before the 
Court by characterizing Mr. Stilling as a pre-trial detainer rather 
than a prisoner of the Oregon State Prison system. See Respondent's 
Brief at 12. While the State is correct in pointing out that the 
I.A.D. does not apply to pretrial detainees, Mr. Stilling was in 
fact a prisoner of the Oregon State system who was in the temporary 
custody of Utah officials pursuant to the I.A.D.; the fact that he 
was awaiting trial in Weber County on the Weber County charges does 
not change that status. 
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The State rationalizes that since Mr. Stilling, "for the 
most part, was being held as a pre-trial detainee in the Weber 
County Jail" (Respondent's Brief at 12), he was precluded from 
participating in rehabilitation programs, since no such programs 
were available at the jail. This position ignores the obvious—that 
while Mr. Stilling was in temporary custody in Otah he was unable to 
participate in programs in Oregon and otherwise disadvantaged by the 
pending charges. Furthermore, the Salt Lake County detention 
extended the length of time that Mr. Stilling was disadvantaged in 
this way. 
The State contends that Salt Lake County officials acted 
diligently and promptly in attempting to bring Mr. Stilling to trial 
and that Mr. Stilling is now seeking to punish Salt Lake County for 
its diligence. Respondent's Brief at 13. On the contrary, while 
Salt Lake County acted somewhat promptly in filing its warrants in 
Weber County on September 19th, shortly after Mr. Stilling's August 
17th arrival in Weber County (R. 303), it did not act promptly in 
bringing him to trial* As outlined in the opening brief at 2-3, 
Mr. Stilling was not transported to Salt Lake County until January 
14, 1985, 118 days after Mr. Stilling's arrival in Utah (R. 93). 
The case was set for trial on March 4, 1985, in violation of Article 
IV of the I.A.D. since it was more than 120 days after Salt Lake 
County filed the warrants requesting custody of Mr. Stilling. 
Furthermore, Mr. Stilling is not attempting to "punish" Salt Lake 
County? he is simply attempting to carry out the provisions of the 
I.A.D. 
- 6 -
The State also contends that Article IV "is the 
prosecutor's half of the I.A.D." Respondent's Brief at 14. The 
State then suggests that any right of a defendant might have to 
redress falls under Article III of the Act. Implicit in the State's 
analysis is the position that a violation of Article IV cannot form 
the basis for a prisonerfs claim, and that a prisoner must rely on 
Article III for redress under the Act. Such a position is without 
merit and contrary to the plain language of the statute and case law. 
Article IV of the I.A.D. states in part: 
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be 
construed to deprive any prisoner of any right which 
he may have to contest the legality of his delivery 
as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such 
delivery may not be opposed or denied on the ground 
that the executive authority of the sending state 
has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such 
delivery. 
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, 
information or complaint contemplated hereby prior 
to the prisoner's being returned to the original 
place of imprisonment pursuant to Article V (e) 
hereof, such indictment, information or complaint 
shall not be of any further force or effect, and the 
court shall enter an order dismissing the same with 
prejudice. 
Utah Code Ann. S77-29-5, Article IV(d)(e) (1953 as amended). 
Article V of the Agreement clarifies that the remedy for 
a*failure to bring a defendant to trial within the time periods set 
forth in Article III or Article IV is dismissal. Article V(c) 
states: 
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or 
fail to accept temporary custody of said person, or 
in the event that an action on the indictment, 
information or complaint on the basis of which the 
detainer has been lodged is not brought to trial 
within the period provided in Article III or Article 
IV hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction 
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where the indictment, information or complaint has 
been pending shall enter an order dismissing the 
same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon 
shall cease to be of any force or effect. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-29-5, Article V(c) (1953 as amended). 
Moreover, various courts have acknowledged that Article 
IV, while providing rights to the states, also establishes 
responsibilities. As the United States Supreme Court pointed out in 
United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. at 352, Article IV imposes two 
limitations on states, one of which is a requirement that the 
prisoner be tried within 120 days of the arrival of the prisoner in 
the state. Hence, Article IV does not solely benefit the state, and 
dismissal is the appropriate remedy where the state fails to bring a 
prisoner to trial within 120 days. 
In addition to mischaracterizing the purpose and effect 
of the I.A.D., the state mischaracterizes Judge Dee's order of April 
10, 1985, and statements made in defense counsel's Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal (See Respondent's Brief at 15, n. 4 and 
16-17). While for the purposes of the Petition for Interlocutory 
Review, defense counsel stated that Mr. Stilling "will assume. . . 
that those conclusions are correct!.]" (See Petition for Permission 
to Appeal from Interlocutory Order, p. 6 contained in Addendum A to 
Appellant's Opening Brief), such statement was limited to that 
Petition. In his April 10, 1985 Order, Judge Dee found that Salt 
Lake County had not legally obtained custody of Mr. Stilling, not 
that the I.A.D. had not been invoked. 
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The State relies on Williams v, State# 426 So.2d 1121 
(Fla. App. 1983), petition for review denied, 437 So.2d 677 (Fla. 
1983) claiming that it "contains facts virtually identical to the 
instant case.11 Respondent's Brief at 17. However, Williams is 
distinguishable from the instant case since the facts in Williams 
established that n[n]either the New York authorities, nor Williams, 
nor Marion County notified authorities that Williams was in Florida 
[ ] w and "Union County did not even know that Williams was in the 
state of Florida." Williams, 426 So.2d at 1122. In the present 
case, Salt Lake County knew that Mr. Stilling was in Utah and knew 
that he had been transferred there from Oregon since Salt Lake 
County had filed a detainer with Oregon officials shortly before it 
filed its warrants in Weber County. Furthermore, as argued in 
Appellant's opening brief at 8-9, the facts suggest that Oregon 
fulfilled its notification requirements pursuant to Article IV(b), 
and any adverse consequences as a result of a failure to comply on 
the part of Oregon, should be charged to Salt Lake County and not 
Mr. Stilling. In the present circumstances where Article IV(b) 
required Oregon to notify Salt Lake County that Mr. Stilling was in 
Weber County and Salt Lake County in fact knew he was in Weber 
County and acted on that knowledge, the decision in Williams is not 
applicable. 
The State's assertion that "[a]ssuming Oregon State 
Prison did not issue an inmate status certificate to Salt Lake 
County officials under Article IV(b) to notify them of defendant's 
temporary transfer to Utah, such would not provide a basis for 
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dismissal of the charges against defendant." (Respondent's Brief at 
17) is not supported by the facts or the clear majority of case law. 
The State apparently cites State v. Barefield, 735 P.2d 
1339 (Wash. App. 1987), Coit v. Statef 440 So.2d 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1983), State v. Clark, 222 Kan. 65, 563 Po2d 1028 (1977) and 
Commonwealth v. Gonce, 320 Pa. Super Ct. 19, 466 A.2d 1039 (1983) in 
support of this proposition. The argument is not compelling for 
three reasons. 
First, the facts suggest that Oregon officials did inform 
Salt Lake County as required since Salt Lake County filed its 
warrants shortly after Mr. Stilling's arrival. (See Appellant's 
Opening Brief at 8-9.) Second, as the Court acknowledged in 
Barefield, 735 P.2d at 1346, there is a split of authority as to 
whether a failure to comply with notice provisions requires 
dismissal. The Barefield Court cited People v. Lincoln, 42 Colo. 
App. 512, 601 P.2d 641 (1979) for the proposition that "compliance 
with notice provisions is mandatory" and People v. Office, 126 Mich. 
App. 597, 337 N.W. 592 (1982) for the proposition that "failure to 
bring formal charges against defendant violates good faith and 
spirit of I.A.D." Id. at 1346. 
Finally, and most importantly, whether Oregon failed to 
give notice as required is not the critical issue. The critical 
concern is that the State failed to bring Mr. Stilling to trial 
within 120 of filing its warrants with Weber County, thereby 
requesting temporary custody of him after having previously filed a 
detainer with Oregon officials. The Agreement explicitly mandates 
dismissal where a receiving state fails to meet the 120 day limit. 
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The State speculates that Mr. Stilling was unavailable 
for trial in Salt Lake County during the time he was in Weber County 
awaiting trial (Respondent's Brief at 19-20). However, while the 
I.A.D. does provide that the 120 day time period will be tolled 
while the defendant is unavailable, it explicitly provides that the 
trial judge shall make any determination as to whether a defendant 
is unavailable and if so, the amount of time so tolled. Utah Code 
Ann. §77-29-5, Article VI(a) (1953 as amended). In this case, there 
is no finding that Mr. Stilling was unavailable for trial in Salt 
Lake County while housed in Weber County and the record in fact 
indicates the contrary—that Mr. Stilling was available from 
September 19, 1984 through early January, 1985. Transcript, March 
13, 1987, p. 25. 
Further, the record indicates that prisoners are often 
transported between Weber and Salt Lake County for trial and that 
Mr. Stilling was in fact transported to Salt Lake County on at least 
two occasions prior to entering his guilty pleas on the Weber County 
cases on February 13, 1985. On January 14, 1985, Mr. Stilling was 
transported to Salt Lake County for an initial appearance (R. 93). 
He was again transported on January 29, 1985 for a preliminary 
hearing (R. 17). Moreover, a review of Mr. Stilling's Weber County 
case, as set forth in State v. Stillings, 709 P.2d 348 (Utah 1985) 
indicates that after Salt Lake County filed its warrants with Weber 
County, Mr. Stilling made at most three brief appearances in Court 
in Weber County—a Motion to Continue on October 26th, a Motion to 
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Dismiss on January 4, 1985, and an entry of guilty pleas on February 
13# 1985.1 Hence, Mr. Stilling was available at all other times and 
the State's speculation to the contrary is erroneous. 
The State cites Onited States v. Royy 830 F.2d 628, 634-5 
(7th Cir. 1987) (Respondent's Brief at 20) in support of its 
hypothesis that Mr. Stilling was unavailable for trial in Salt Lake 
County the entire time he was held in Weber County. Roy, however, 
involved a defendant who was in state custody while a pending 
detainer on federal charges existed. Under such circumstances, the 
defendant would have to be removed from state to federal custody, 
pursuant to the I.A.D. (just as Mr. Stilling was placed in the 
temporary custody of Utah from Oregon) in order to be tried. Such a 
circumstance is completely different from the circumstance in Mr. 
Stilling1s case where the State of Utah was prosecuting both the 
Weber and Salt Lake County cases and Mr. Stilling was in fact 
available and actually transported to Salt Lake County while the 
Weber County charges were still pending. Hence, Roy is inapplicable 
to this case. 
Finally, the State attempts to distinguish United States 
v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340 (1978) by arguing that Mr. Stilling, unlike 
the defendant in Mauro, made no request for speedy disposition and 
Salt Lake County made no request for temporary custody directly to 
Oregon Officials (Respondent's Brief at 21). However, pursuant to 
1
 Prior to the filing of the Salt Lake County warrants, Mr. Stilling 
apparently made an initial appearance, thereafter waived his 
preliminary hearing and was arraigned in District Court. The record 
in this case suggests the possibility of another brief appearance in 
Weber County on November 2, 1984. Transcript, March 13, 1987, p. 45. 
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Article IV, the state has the responsibility of proceeding in a 
timely manner, and whether a defendant makes a request for speedy 
disposition has no bearing on whether the matter should be dismissed 
under that Article, In addition, the record indicates that Mr. 
Stilling repeatedly questioned his lawyer on the Weber County 
charges and the prosecutor in that case regarding the status of the 
Salt Lake County charges. He also called the Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association and was told that office could not represent 
him until he was arraigned on the Salt Lake County charges and the 
court appointed the office to represent him. Transcript March 13, 
1987, p. 25-26.2 Hence, Mr. Stilling was not represented on the 
Salt Lake County charges until his arraignment on January 14, 1985. 
In addition, the Mauro Court established that the term 
"written request for temporary custody" would not be given an unduly 
restrictive meaning. Ijd. at 362. The Mauro Court held that the 
"United States is bound by the Agreement when it activates its 
provisions by filing a detainer against a state prisoner and then 
obtains this custody by means of a writ of habeas corpus and pro se 
quendum". Mauro, 436 U.S. at 349. In reaching its decision in 
Mauro, the United States Supreme Court pointed out that the concern 
was not the means by which the United States obtained custody after 
filing a detainer, but the fact that"the United States is able to 
obtain temporary custody of the prisoner." Mauro, 436 U.S. at 362. 
2
 This is the procedure generally followed for appointment of 
counsel for indigent cases in Salt Lake County. Most indigent 
defendants are not represented prior to the first appearance in 
Circuit Court in Salt Lake County. 
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In the instant case, Salt Lake County took the easiest 
route for obtaining custody of Mr. Stilling by filing warrants with 
Weber County even though it was aware that Mr. Stilling was an 
Oregon prisoner. At the time Salt Lake County filed the warrants, 
it believed it could obtain temporary custody of Mr. Stilling in 
that manner. The State now attempts to argue for a strict 
interpretation of the term "request for temporary custody,M and 
ignores its own efforts in attempting to obtain custody of Mr. 
Stilling. Such an argument undermines the fairness rationale behind 
the I.A.D. 
In this case, where Salt Lake County filed a detainer 
with Oregon officials, thereby activating the I.A.D. and thereafter 
made a request for temporary custody by filing its warrants with 
Weber County, the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the case 
after Salt Lake County failed to bring Mr. Stilling to trial within 
120 days after the warrants were filed. The State lost track of the 
case (R. 1720) for more than 120 days, and thereby violated the 
provisions of Article IV, mandating dismissal. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, and all of the reasons 
set forth in Appellant's Opening Brief and at oral argument, Mr. 
Stilling respectfully requests that this Court reverse his case and 
remand the matter for dismissal, or, in the alternative, a new 
trial. Mr. Stilling also requests that this Court vacate his 
sentence and remand the case to the District Court with an order 
directing that court to correct its illegal sentence. 
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DATED this <yO day of May, 1988. 
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